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Abstract 
This article explores the perception of Ecuadorian population concerning the political style of 
Presidents Rafael Correa and Lenín Moreno and their links to populism, one of the most interesting 
features of the Ecuadorian political arena. The analysis is based on a survey designed and applied by the 
authors at a national level. The quantitative data was interpreted using linear multiple regression 
models, to understand which of the variables analyzed can explain the perception of the interviewees. 
The results were extrapolated by using a descriptive statistical analysis (means, standard deviation and 
correlation matrix). The article shows that a difference between Correa and Moreno’s styles exists and 
this difference is clearly perceived by Ecuadorian population. While populist features are strongly 
identified in Correa’s political style, they are less remarked in Moreno’s rhetoric and action. This 
difference marks a discontinuity in the use of populism in the political style of the two presidents. 
 
Keywords: Populism, Rafael Correa, Lenín Moreno, Ecuador. 
 
 
Background 
 
The Ecuadorian presidential elections of 2017 resulted in the victory of 
Lenín Moreno, the current president. Moreno, who belongs to the “Alianza PAIS” 
party - the same party founded by Moreno’s predecessor Rafael Correa - was vice-
president during the previous term and was supported by the former president 
during the electoral campaign. Lenín Moreno was presented as the only possible 
leader who could continue to lead the “Revolución Ciudadana.”
1
 As a consequence, 
                                               
*  Pasquale Cerbone is Full Professor of the Faculty of Administration Sciences, at the 
Universidad UTE (pasquale.cerbone@ute.edu.ec). 
**  María Pereira López is Associate Professor of the Faculty of Political and Social Science, 
at the Universidad de Santiago de Compostela (maria.pereira.lopez@usc.es). 
1  The “Revolución Ciudadana” (citizen revolution) is the name of the political program of 
Rafael Correa. Fernando Hallo and Rafael Camino, “La campaña electoral del 2017 en el 
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many politicians speculated on the eventual continuity of the governmental and 
political style of Rafael Correa during Moreno’s presidential term; indeed, partially, 
the conditions for a post-populism case, according to the definition given by Filc
2
 
subsisted. According to the opposition parties, this continuity would have meant a 
catastrophe for national democracy. Surprisingly, the newly elected president made 
important changes both in the political system and in the form of government.
3
 
Using as a pretext the very negative economic reality, Moreno made reforms that 
went in total opposition with Correa’s policies and declarations at the end of his 
term.
4
 Moreover, the small margin by which Moreno won the second round of 
national elections (51% vs. 49%) and the accusations of electoral fraud made by his 
direct opponent
5
 created conditions in which the new president could not count on 
the same popular consent of his predecessor, diluting any post-populist conditions. 
Likewise, low incomes, caused by the decline in the international oil price, along 
with a high rate of external debt, forced the new president to operate progressive 
cuts of the public budget, which generated a diminution in the political support of 
the members of his own party
6
 and a decline of the public approval rating.
7
 
Consequently, the accusations of bad administration and continuous meddling in 
the political scene made by Correa, motivated Moreno to direct his political action 
towards changing the legal structure that regulates governmental dynamics. First of 
all, he called for a constitutional referendum (2018) to derogate the possibility of 
being reelected indefinitely,
8
 thereby preventing his predecessor from being elected 
in the future.
9
 Likewise, he proposed reforms which aimed at granting greater 
                                                                                                                   
Ecuador. Un análisis desde la perspectiva el marketing sensorial”, in Economía y 
Negocios, (2017), online, https://doi.org/10.29019/eyn.v8i1.317. 
2  Dani Filc, “Post-populism: explaining neoliberal populism through the habitus,” Journal 
of Political Ideologies (2011): 221-238, https://doi.org/10.1080/13569317.2011.575685. 
3  Sebastián Angulo, Moreno: “La mesa servida” obliga a ajustes tributarios, Expreso, (2017), online, 
https://www.expreso.ec/economia/leninmoreno-economia-ajustes-tributarios-empreasas-K 
N1825518. 
4  Redacción El Universo, “A Lenín Moreno le toca pagar ‘consumo’ de una mesa que no 
estaba ‘servida’,” El Universo, July 16, 2017, online. 
5  The accusations were motivated by the hypothetical control that Correa had on the 
National Electoral Council. Redacción El Universo, “Guillermo Lasso denuncia fraude 
electoral ante misión de observadores de la OEA,” El Universo, Abril 3, 2017, online. 
6  Redacción El Periódico, “Seguidores de Correa protagonizan marcha contra el Gobierno 
de Ecuador,” El Periódico (2018), online, https://www.elperiodico.com/es/internacional 
/20180411/seguidores-de-correa-protagonizan-marcha-contra-el-gobierno-de-ecuador6749397. 
7  According to the pollster CEDATOS, in august 2017, credibility on Lenín Moreno figure 
presented a 67% value, meanwhile after less than a year the value has declined below the 40%. 
“Encuestas 2018”, CEDATOS, last modified March 6, 2019, http://www.cedatos.com.ec/ 
detalles_noticia.php?Id=369. 
8  In 2015 the ex-president Rafael Correa changed Ecuadorian Constitution by allowing the 
indefinite presidential reelection. According to Carvajal (2015), the procedure followed to 
amend the Constitution was quite questionable.  
9  The first version of Ecuadorian Constitution of 2008 contemplated only a possibility of 
reelection for presidents. Rafael Correa modified this principle through a constitutional 
amendment process in 2015. The referendum of 2018, asked to people to return to the 
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independence to public institutions (e.g. he proposed to reform the Consejo de 
Participación Ciudadana y Control Social), in order to balance the sharing of power 
and functions among different branches of the State, and particularly among the 
president and other state institutions. Moreover, Moreno’s less personalistic 
political style seems to put his style in contraposition with Correa’s style. Given that 
Correa has been presented by many scholars as a populist politician, one might 
affirm that the current president is adopting a change against this particular political 
style, and the works of many experts confirm this perception.
10
  
In order to explore this topic, we propose an investigation in which, through 
an opinion poll conducted from May - July 2018 by the research support team of 
Universidad UTE, the scholars’ general theory about populism is compared with 
the perception of the Ecuadorian people. Indeed, the current Ecuadorian research 
concerning the topic of “populism” is reduced to a theoretical production, based on 
qualitative methods that, although they are valid and useful, do not complete the 
analytic view of this phenomenon, in which the perception of the electorate plays an 
important role. Moreover, given that populism is a particular and multiform 
phenomenon, characterized by a huge number of elements, this study clarifies the 
elements which appeared to be more sensitive to the perception of the electorate. 
This definition could help analysts to consider those elements when making voter 
forecasts, although only in terms of “tendency”.
11
 Finally, for the purpose of this 
study, given that populism is a phenomenon which uses tools (rhetoric, image, etc.) 
that can produce strong effects on people, it was necessary to consider how public 
opinion considers Moreno, in comparison with his antecessor. This approach would 
clarify if the discontinuity in populism observed by scholars is also perceived by 
population at large.  
 
 
Theories of Populism in Ecuador 
 
Ecuadorian political context is characterized by a presidential form of 
government and a high level of socio-political and normative instability.
12
 Since 
1830, Ecuador has had 20 constitutions, about 50 presidents and several military 
boards;
13
 that is to say that on average every ten years the country approved a new 
                                                                                                                   
anterior version of that principle, so preventing Rafael Correa, who was elected three 
times, to run again for presidential elections. 
10  Manuela Celi Moscoso, “Lenín Moreno: un punto de inflexión para Alianza País?”, Nueva 
Sociedad, (2017): 4-16, https://nuso.org/articulo/lenin-moreno-un-punto-de-inflexion-para-alianza-pais/. 
11  Manuel Mora, El poder de la conversación. Elementos para una teoría de la opinión 
pública (Buenos Aires: La Crucija, 2005). 
12  Juan Paz y Miño Cepeda, Ecuador: una democracia inestable (Quito, Haol, 2006), 89-99, 
https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=2380207. 
13  It occurred during the periods of democratic crisis. Walsh School of Foreign Service: 
Center for Latinamerican Studies. (2009). Political Database of the Americas, República 
del Ecuador. Washington D.C.: Georgetown University. 
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constitution and every three years voted for a new president. There is no doubt that 
this constitutes a particular political idiosyncrasy, which remarkably conditions and 
explains the current and, potentially, the future political situation of this Latin-
American country. 
One of the main researchers of the Ecuadorian political scene, Carlos de 
la Torre
14
 states that one of the elements that historically influenced the 
instability of the country is populism, which still negatively affects the 
Ecuadorian democratic process; for this reason we are investigating if in 
Ecuador, according to Ecuadorian perception, we are at the front of a continuity 
or discontinuity in terms of populism.  
As a matter of fact, from the point of view of a liberal democracy, 
populism constitutes a disruptive factor: if we accept the idea argued by 
Sartori
15
 that liberal democracy is better than the other imaginable versions of 
democracy because of its unique political form able to grant the political rights 
of minorities, we should deduce that populism cannot be conciliated with such a 
system. As a matter of fact, the pretention of this “political style”
16
 is to 
embrace the majority of the electorate in a unique majoritarian subject: the 
“people”,
17
 and to exclude minority, that is to say the “anti-people”,
18
 from 
political action. Minority, which frequently takes the name of “elite” or 
“oligarchy”, is accused of corrupting the political system and to be the cause of 
a contextual degradation, according to a Manichaean vision of society.
19
 
Furthermore, considering that one of the most important pillars of democracy is 
horizontal accountability,
20
 the typical political personalism used in the populist 
experience hugely reduces this practice. Indeed, populism changes liberal 
democratic process in a continuous “plebiscitary acclamation”,
21
 whereby 
                                               
14  Carlos de la Torre, La seducción velazquista (Quito: FLACSO, 1993). 
15  Giovanni Sartori,  ¿Qué es la democracia? (Milan: Rizzoli, 1993). 
16  Kurt Weyland, “Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin 
American Politics,” Comparative Politics (2001): 1-22. 
17  That is to say a political, massive, undetermined and majoritarian group belonging to the 
electoral body. Margareth Canovan, “Trust the People! Populism and the two Faces of 
Democracy,” Political Studies (1999): 2-16, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.00184. 
18  Luís Zanatta, “¿Populismos de izquierda? El caso de América Latina,” Dialogos (2018): 
74-91, https://revistas.ucr.ac.cr/index.php/dialogos/article/view/34768/34437. 
19  Carlos de la Torre, “Populism and the politics of the extraordinary in Latin America,” 
Journal of Political Ideologies (2016): 121-139, https://doi.org/10.1080/13569317. 
2016.1150137. 
20  Manuel Sánchez de Dios, “Nueva perspectiva de la responsabilidad política: la ‘teoría de 
la agencia’,” Revista de las Cortes Generales (2006): 139-181, https://www.ucm.es/ 
data/cont/docs/862-2014-10-10-Cortes%20Generales-2006.pdf. 
21  Carlos de la Torre, “Populismo radical y democracias en los Andes,” Journal of 
Democracy en Español (2014): 24-37, https://www.flacsoandes.edu.ec/agora/populismo-
radical-y-democracia-en-los-andes. 
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taking the form of a “delegative democracy”,
22
 which would consist of the 
claim, of populist leaders, to justify their actions by using popular consent and 
by stating that in this way they allow greater participation.
23
 Indeed, in the case 
of weak public institutions, populist leaders take the form of “caudillos”, who 
are leaders that can act regardless of the law.
24
 
Nevertheless, beyond its relation with democracy, in order to 
theoretically systematize the topic of populism some considerations have to be 
added: the variability of this phenomenon maintains the debate about its nature, 
structure and contents constantly open.
25
 Moreover, even if political scientists 
offer no univocal vision about the concept of populism, there is no relevant 
theory either that can demonstrate its needlessness to understand some political 
contexts. So, the lack of a generally accepted definition of the concept of 
“populism” is only a theoretical difficulty, meanwhile its phenomenological 
analysis responds to the practical need to be able to recognize it when it occurs. 
This explains the opportuneness of the presented investigation.  
It is for this reason that this article proposes a brief description of the 
theories about populism, focusing particularly on the elements that can typify it.  
Gino Germani, a pioneer in the analysis of this phenomenon, explained 
its genesis in the Argentinean social popular movements during the 1930s and 
1940s as a consequence of the changes in the socio-economical structure of this 
country.
26
 This is the reason why, initially, populism was considered 
specifically a social problem. Nevertheless, the popular nature from which this 
phenomenon took its name was not able to completely explain its essence. This 
motivated Torcuato di Tella to continue investigating this topic: he concluded 
that the masses of workers that led the protests in Argentina at that time were 
actually manipulated by the excluded political elites, in order to obtain power.
27
 
He thus deduced that populism arises from the coincidence between the 
reformist will of those excluded elites and the consent of “plebs”. Similarly, 
Laclau
28
 stated that the socio-historical approach, which was thought to be 
                                               
22  Guillermo O’ Donnell, “Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies,” Journal of 
Democracy (1998): 112-126, https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.1998.0051. 
23  Pablo Castaño, “Populism and democracy,” Revista Internacional de Sociología (2018): 
1-8, https://doi.org/10.3989/ris.2018.76.4.18.089. 
24  Jorge Carpizo, “Características esenciales del sistema presidencial e influencias para su 
instauración en América Latina,” Boletín Mexicano de Derecho Comparado (2006): 57-
91, http://www.scielo.org.mx/pdf/bmdc/v39n115/v39n115a2.pdf. 
25  Carlos de la Torre and Oscar Mazzoleni, “Do We Need a Minimum Definition of 
Populism? An Appraisal of Mudde Conceptualization,” Populism (2019): 79-95, 
https://doi.org/10.1163/25888072-02011021. 
26  Gino Germani, Sociología de la modernización: estudios teóricos, metodológicos y 
aplicados a América Latina (Buenos Aires: Paídos, 1969). 
27  Germani, Sociología de la modernización. 
28  Ernesto Laclau, Política e ideología en la teoría marxista. Capitalismo, fascismo, 
populismo, (Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1978). 
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necessary to understand this phenomenon, cannot explain it exhaustively, 
because populism took place as much in developed as in developing countries. 
For this reason, the element that can explain it better is not the class struggle 
(which is typical of social transition periods), but the existence of unsatisfied 
elites which are able to drag popular groups, by using, as the only ideological 
element, the need to undermine the political system in power. This theory 
motivates the following scholars to give populism a political focus.  
As Laclau
29
 argues, for populism to arise distinct popular groups have to 
identify themselves as a unique subject. This, along with the subjective feature 
of populism that is its quality of being disruptive, defines its object: the 
formation of a base, through the aggregation of different popular sets, in order 
to win elections. This process of homogenization, through which the “people 
narrative” is built,
30
 is the consequence of a certain grade of emptiness or 
ambiguity of populist political content, which is never totally preset and that is 
typical of populist political programs. This allows politicians to delineate 
themselves as “empty significants”, who are able to absorb all the unsatisfied 
demands of the different popular groups to which they are referring. So, from 
this point of view, populism could be also identified with a strategy to obtain 
power,
31
 especially, when existing socio-economic conditions allow some 
figures to try to rise to political power by taking advantage of topics to which 
the people appear to be more sensitive. Recently, praxis has offered scholars 
sufficient examples to be able to define a set of features related to populism, 
although these features are not always entirely present in different experiences. 
First of all, populism constitutes a weak ideology
32
 that is sustained by 
strong ideological elements. Thus, populism can fit in different political and 
economic schemes, without losing its essence. Indeed, Gratius and Rivero 
33
 
state that it is inadequate to classify populism according to specific ideological 
categories (like “right-populism” or “left-populism”), inasmuch as populism is a 
phenomenon which does not accept the dialectics typical of pluralist systems. In 
practice, the political antagonism which characterizes it is not ideological but 
                                               
29  Ernesto Laclau, La razón populista, (Londres: Verso, 2005). 
30  Francisco Panizza, “Fisuras entre Populismo y Democracia en América Latina,” 
Stockholm Review of Latin American Studies (2008):  81-93, http://pdfhumanidades.com/ 
sites/default/filessites/default/files/apuntes/135_panizza%20fisuras%20populismo%20y%
20democracia.pdf. 
31  IPSOS, “The Rise of Populism: A Global Approach,” (2017).   
32  Ben Stanley, “The thin ideology of populism,” Journal of Political Ideologies (2008): 95-
110, https://doi.org/10.1080/13569310701822289. 
33  Susanne Gratius and Ángel Rivero, “Más allá de la izquierda y la derecha: populismo en 
Europa y América Latina,” Revista CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals (2017): 35-61, 
https://doi.org/10.24241/rcai.2018.119.2.35. 
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social-based, or moral-based
34
 and it is articulated on the dichotomy “people vs. 
elite”. As a matter of fact, even if populists frequently wave different 
ideological flags, in practice they can act according to one ideological scheme 
or another, so by denying their association to a particular creed.
35
 
Many authors
36
 recognize the creation of a dichotomy: “popular 
majority” vs. “oligarchic or elitist minority” (both categories, with extremely 
labile confines) as the most descriptive feature of populism. Particularly, the 
majoritarian subject would embody all the positive values of society, whilst the 
minority is presented as encompassing all the existing social anti-values.
37
  
In this dichotomy an important role is played in designation of a 
charismatic leader
38
 who can create a direct link with the “people”.
39
 In 
populism this link plays a crucial role, because through this connection the 
“people” start to accept the leader’s decisions simply because they emanate 
from his person.
40
 In this way a delegative democracy is produced.  
The identification of the “people-leader” allows the leader to set himself 
as the only person able to interpret the popular will.
41
 This creates a circular 
process of self-legitimation.
42
 
For this reason, the discursive dimension of populism is characterized by 
a simple metanarrative, able to influence people’s imagination and which 
                                               
34  Cass Mudde and Cristobal Rovira-Kaltwasser, Populism in Europe and the Americas. 
Threat or Corrective for Democracy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
35  Rodrigo Borja, “Democracia y Populismo,” Nueva Sociedad (1983): 126-130, 
https://nuso.org/articulo/democracia-y-populismo/. 
36  Kurt Weyland, “Neopopulism and Neoliberalism in Latin America: Unexpected Af 
nities,” Studies in Comparative International Development (1996): 3-31, Margareth 
Canovan, “Trust the People! Populism and the two Faces of Democracy,” Political 
Studies (1999): 2-16, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.00184, Anthony Peter Spanakos, 
“New Wine, Old Bottles, Flamboyant Sommelier: Chávez, Citizenship, and Populism,” 
New Political Science (2008): 521-544, https://doi.org/1 0.1080/07393140802493308, 
Cass Mudde, “The Populist Zeitgeist. Government and Opposition,” Blackwell Publishing 
(2004): 541-563, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00135.x. 
37  Carlos de la Torre, “Populism and Nationalism in Latin America,” Journal of the 
European Institute for Communication and Culture (2017): 1-16, https://doi.org/ 
10.1080/13183222.2017.1330731. 
38  Carlos de la Torre, “The Ambiguous Meanings of Latin American Populisms,” Social 
Research (1992): 385-414, Margareth Canovan, “Trust the People! Populism and the two 
Faces of Democracy,” Political Studies (1999): 2-16, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-
9248.00184. 
39  Kurt Weyland, “Neopopulism and Neoliberalism in Latin America: Unexpected Af 
nities,” Studies in Comparative International Development (1996): 3-31, Francisco 
Panizza, Populism and the Mirror of Democracy (Londres: Verso, 2005). 
40  Panizza, “Fisuras entre Populismo.”  
41  Carlos de la Torre, “Populism and the politics of the extraordinary in Latin America,” 
Journal of Political Ideologies (2016): 121-139, https://doi.org/10.1080/ 
13569317.2016.1150137. 
42  Spanakos, “New Wine, Old Bottles.”  
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contains the following narrative patterns: first, the element of a “new 
beginning” is strongly used
43
 to represent the “people’s” chance to demolish the 
existing political context and to create a new or redeemed reality,
44
 which can 
allow people to overcome hostile situations. Second, the logic of “radical 
change” is employed during electoral campaigns, as an instrument intended to 
obtain political power. Third, the idea of an “imminent enemy” (either internal 
or external to the national context), who embodies the characteristics of the 
antagonist of the people
45
 is an element used to maintain power, by creating the 
idea in peoples’ imagination that it is always possible to go back to a 
“catastrophic past” if a change occurs in the current regime. Fourth, the idea of 
“revolution” is frequently adopted in Latin American populist experiences with 
the aim of overcoming critical moments. Indeed, in this case, the revolution idea 
consists of a process with indefinite durability, whose fulfillment can only be 
achieved by the figure of the populist leader.
46
 As a matter of fact, in one of his 
books, Nuñez Sánchez
47
 stated that without the charismatic leadership of 
Correa, the achievement of the “Revolución Ciudadana” would not have been 
possible. Moreover, this last element is frequently contextualized in the epical 
popular imagination, through which the populist metanarrative is strengthened 
by assuming that logical continuity exists between the populist leader and 
important historical or religious figures of the past.
48
 Finally, it is interesting to 
take into consideration the populists’ use of clothing as a symbolic element to 
convey meaning and to communicate a sense of belonging.
49
 
 
                                               
43  Ibid.  
44  Margareth Canovan, “Trust the People! Populism and the two Faces of Democracy,” 
Political Studies (1999): 2-16, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.00184. 
45  Camil Ungureanu and Iván Serrano, “El populismo como relato y la crisis de la 
democracia representativa,” Revista CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals (2018): 13-33, 
https://doi.org/10.24241/rcai.2018.119.2.13. 
46  Panizza, “Fisuras entre Populismo”, Luís Zanatta, “¿Populismos de izquierda? El caso de 
América Latina,” Dialogos (2018): 74-91, https://revistas.ucr.ac.cr/index.php/ 
dialogos/article/view/34768/34437. 
47  Jorge Nuñez Sánchez, Ecuador: Revolución Ciudadana y Buen Vivir (Quito: Yulca 
Editorial, 2014). 
48  De la Torre, “Populism and Nationalism in Latin America,”: 1-16, Jenny Alexandra 
Jiménez and Santiago Patarroyo, “El populismo en contextos democráticos en América 
Latina: revisión a los significantes vacíos en el discurso de tres líderes populistas, un 
estudio desde el análisis político del discurso,” Revista Mexicana de Ciencias Políticas y 
Sociales (2018): 255-287, https://doi.org/10.22201/fcpys.2448492xe.2019.235.64566. 
49  Irina Bajini, “Para una aproximación a la (r) evolución del discurso político 
latinoamericano desde Fidel Castro hasta Rafael Correa,” Altre Modernitá (2010): 133-
155 https://doi.org/10.13130/2035-7680/519, Alejandro Espí, “La dimensión emocional 
de los movimientos políticos populistas de S.XXI en América Latina y Europa,” Miguél 
Hernández Communication Journal (2019): 101-121, http://dx.doi.org/10.21134/ 
mhcj.v10i0.277. 
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Methodology 
 
The following article is the result of data exploration, made from an 
opinion survey conducted from May 15, 2018 to July 20, 2018. This 
investigation was executed in collaboration with researchers of the Universidad 
UTE (Quito, Ecuador) and Universidad de Santiago de Compostela (Santiago 
de Compostela, Spain). The study is based on five thematic blocks: 1) political 
preferences; 2) democracy; 3) populism; 4) state institutions; 5) presidential 
style. The survey consisted of 161 questions, which were designed to analyze 
the interviewees’ perception of the specified topics. Blocks 3 and 5 used the 
same questions to first analyze the perception of surveyed about Rafael Correa 
and then analyze their perception of Lenín Moreno. The importance of this 
study is determined by the lack of data concerning these topics and by the 
creation of a new survey instrument, through which it is possible to match the 
ample theory produced on this theme with data that can confirm its consistency, 
limit its treatment or direct it to further and new considerations. The considered 
universe was the total of Ecuadorian electoral body. To determine the sample 
(n=1068) we used the population projection data for 2018 from the Instituto 
Nacional de Estadística y Censos de Ecuador.
50
 A confidence level of 95% was 
used, and an error range of ±3% was assumed, by the most unfavorable 
assumption of p=q. We used a simple random sample, geographically and 
population-based stratified. Moreover, to prevent a minimal representation of 
less inhabited provinces of Ecuador, the sample was allocated in the following 
way: 50% equally distributed over all the provinces and 50% according to the 
number of habitants of each of the 24 provinces. To allow a better 
representation of the sexes and the age-groups,
51
 we used a proportional 
standard.
52
 The questionnaire was administered personally by the pollsters 
through direct interviews, and the answers were measured through an interval 
scale from 0 to 10. To define each question, a pilot survey was carried out. 
Once the data was classified in a matrix all missing data was removed and 
bivariate and multivariate analyses were done.  
To clarify meaning for readers, the following outcome table was created. 
It contains the list of used variables, their category and codification, and when it 
was necessary a part of the literary sources used to identify them (the same cited 
in this article) (Table 1). 
                                               
50   “Proyección por edades Provincias 2010-2020 y nacional”, INEC, accessed January 10, 
2018, http://www.ecuadorencifras.gob.ec/proyecciones-poblacionales/. 
51  The considered age-groups start from the category “18 to 19” and end with the category 
“more than 80”. 
52  Javier Portela García, Técnicas básicas de Muestreo con SAS (Madrid: Universidad 
Complutense, 2007). 
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The first block named “populist rhetoric”, gathers some variables 
considered to be fundamental to identify populist actors. Indeed, as it was 
explained in the previous section, rhetoric is composed of different elements, 
which all participate in creating the dichotomist vision of populist discourse. 
Particularly, the variables: “He mentioned the existence of foreigner enemies, 
hostile to his person and ideas”, “He mentioned the existence of hostile 
situations to his person and ideas”, “He mentioned the existence of one national 
élite hostile to his person and ideas”, and “He mentioned that his government 
team and he are totally honest, capable and coherent, whilst his opponents are 
totally dishonest, incapable and incoherent” express the way in which populist 
politicians strengthen the feeling of identification with the electoral body, 
through the creation of the image of an indefinite enemy who prevent the 
populist “hero” from its affirmation.  
The variables: “He mentioned to represent majority popular will”, “He 
mentioned that minority corresponds to an oligarchy or elite, that is part of a 
corrupted power” and “He mentioned that his opponents’ attitudes are 
misleading and can produce damage to the country” regard the discursive 
elements, in populist rhetoric, through which the idea of “the people” is created. 
Finally, the variables: “He mentioned important past politicians (e.g. Simón 
Bolívar or Fidel Castro)” and “He mentioned that his ideals are revolutionary”, 
allow us to analyse the way in which populist leaders try to transmit the 
message of a logical continuity between his person and important past 
politicians, in order to self-legitimatize themselves.  
The second group of variables analyses another facet of populism: 
personalism. As theory shows, it is very important for populist actors to 
personally create a strong link with the people, thereby producing a complete 
identification between the people and their figures. So, the variables: “He based 
his political campaign on his imagine”, “He showed himself as the only possible 
leader of his party”, “He showed himself as captivating”, “He used clothing 
(shirts, hats, ties, etc.) to be identifiable”, identify the form by which populists, 
by concentrating public attention on such links, distract people from the 
frequent indetermination of their political programs. Moreover, through their 
strength of image, the before mentioned delegation of power is created. 
Then, we chose to use the variables: “Populism is a positive factor in 
politics” and “You think that Correa/Moreno is a populist”, to define the 
perception of populism, as a form of contrasting the given answers. Instead, the 
variable “How do you asses the figure of Correa/Moreno?” is used to 
understand if the general expressed perception is influenced by the preferences 
of the interviewed. The variable “You think that during Correa/Moreno’s 
government political participation has grown” was included in the survey tool 
with the aim of taking into consideration an element that theory has put in 
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evidence: the feeling of growing participation of the people during populist 
governments. 
Finally, the variables “You feel identified with Correa/Moreno” were 
used as dependents, in forthcoming multivariate regression, because the aim of 
this study is to understand if the preference expressed by the interviewed of 
each president is influenced by the perceived existence of populist variables. 
So, according to the chosen methodology two hypotheses were generated: 
H1: Ecuadorians recognize a difference in political style in the comparison 
between Correa and Moreno.  
H0: Ecuadorians do not recognize a difference in political style in the 
comparison between Correa and Moreno.  
If H1 hypothesis were true, it would be important that, in terms of the 
discontinuity in populism, the outcomes express that the difference between the 
presidents is based on the perception of the existence of a populist style in 
Rafael Correa, but not in Lenín Moreno.  
 
 
Analysis of the Outcomes 
 
In order to observe the degree of correlation among the chosen variables 
and to test their correct use, two correlation matrixes are presented (one for each 
of the assessed presidents). For each combination of variables Spearman’s 
coefficient was used (** = p > 0.05 o * = p > 0.01) and the number of subjects 
was indicated with which the correlation was checked (Table 2; Table 3). 
As it can be observed in the first matrix, there is no correlation in only 
five combinations of variables: the no correlation between PPR – PFP and CPP 
– PFP indicates that people do not recognize a relation between, on one hand, 
the use of clothing and, on the other hand, Correa’s populist quality, and the 
goodness of populism; moreover, the lack of correlation in the combinations 
VFP – MSA, VFP – CIP and VFP – ULP, shows that people think that the fact 
of having mentioned the existence of hostile situations, having used the image 
of his person during political campaign and having shown himself as the unique 
possible leader of his party, do not influence the general approval that people 
have of Correa (which can be considered as reasonable). Regarding the matrix 
related to the figure of Lenín Moreno, a greater number of combinations are not 
significant. Particularly, sixteen out of seventeen variables (PFP – MHC, PFP – 
MPP, PFP – MIR, PFP – CIP, PFP – ULP, PFP – PPR, VFP – MEE, VFP – 
MSA, VFP – MEC, VFP – MMO, VFP – MAE, VFP – MPP, VFP – CIP, VFP 
– ULP, VFP – PPR, VFP – CPP), which could have influenced the general 
approval that people have of Moreno present no correlation with this variable. It 
explains, although only in a preliminary way, that the approval of the current 
president does not depend on the existence of populist elements in his political 
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style. To have a clearer idea about the general assessment given to each 
considered element, a table is presented containing a brief descriptive analysis, 
with the means and standard deviations of each variable (Table 4). 
To start with, considering the used rating scale evaluating the figures of 
both presidents we can see the existence of an ambiguity factor: as a matter of 
fact, it can be observed that the average level of identification of the 
interviewees with Rafael Correa (4,6) is higher than the one expressed about 
Lenín Moreno (4,0); nonetheless, this data contrasts with the question about the 
general assessment of their figures, which presents a higher value for Moreno 
(5,1) than for Correa (3,8). Despite that, based on the observation of each mean 
value, it can be clearly observed in the variables related to “rhetoric” and 
“personalism” that people perceive the existence of populist elements in 
Correa’s political style. Instead, in the case of Moreno a different situation can 
be observed, inasmuch as the same variables used to assess the current president 
present lower values. 
So, in order to establish definitively if people perceive Correa and 
Moreno as populists, and to indicate which variables most explain this 
perception, multiple linear regression models were executed. To validate the 
models, initially the adjusted determination coefficient (R
2
) was checked 
according to the scale proposed by Rojo (2007),
53
 and then the existence of 
collinearity among the variables (Table 6). To fit the model and select the 
independent variables that can explain it, the technic of manual progressive 
elimination was used.
54
 To facilitate the analysis, a double comparative table 
was designed, which contains the coefficients and standard error of each one of 
the presented models, likewise the level of significance of each variable. The 
adjusted determination coefficient and the value of the constants
55
 were also 
presented (Table 5; Table 6). 
The table confirms the existence of a model valid and “good” in the case 
of Rafael Correa, which presents an adjusted R
2
 of 0,425: it means that the 
variables included in this model explain the 42, 5% of the variance of the 
dependent variable. Then, the variables that most explain the model are the 
positive appreciation that interviewees have of Rafael Correa, the fact that he 
shows himself as captivating (DCA) and the feeling that participation has 
increased during his term (APP). As it can be observed in the Beta values 
(Table 6), these are the variables that present the major weight on the dependent 
                                               
53  Scale: (< 0.3 = very bad, 0.3 - 0.4 = bad, 0.4 – 0.5 = regular, 0.5 – 0.85 = good, > 0.85 = 
suspicious). 
54  José Manuel Rojo, Regresión con variable dependiente cualitativa, (Madrid: Instituto de 
Economía y Geografía de Madrid, 2007). 
55  In the Table 6 it is added the value of the standardized coefficient which were used also to 
compare the variables and, as a consequence, to indicate the relative weight that each one 
of them has on the dependent variable, likewise the values of the multicollinearity 
analysis executed. 
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one. Among all the variables only two: the rhetorical use of the “hostile elite” 
(MEC) and the use of the personal image (CIP) present an inverse relation with 
the dependent variable.   
Concerning the model related to Lenín Moreno, the adjusted R
2
 present a 
value of 0,285, which means that the selected variables explain only the 28,5% 
of the dependent variable. So, the model can be considered as “bed”, which is to 
say that the elements related to populism cannot explain the feeling of 
identification that the interviewees have with the current president. 
Nevertheless, by observing the model we can notice that the variables that 
explain it the most are the positive appreciation that people have of the 
president (VFP), the fact of being captivating (DCA), the use of clothing to be 
identifiable (PPR) and the feeling that participation is increasing during his 
government (APP). This can indicate that, even if an obvious difference exists 
with his predecessor, Lenín Moreno is still trying to use some populist features 
to attract people.  
It can thus be concluded that the electorate perceives something in 
common between Moreno and his predecessor (as far as populist style is 
concerned) but Correa used a stronger populist style than Moreno, according to 
the analysed perception. 
 
 
Limitations and Recommendations 
 
These outcomes come from a study that was executed during the very initial 
period of government of the current Ecuadorian president, Lenín Moreno. The 
analysis was conducted at this time to analyse the political style of Rafael Correa 
before the perception of people was influenced by the actions and decisions of the 
current president. Moreover, the perception of Lenín Moreno can only be 
considered as partial, because his term will finish in 2021. This is the reason why 
variables related to the institutions were not used to analyse the perception of the 
population about populism. Indeed, the institution’s erosion is a process that is 
fulfilled in the long term, and it would have created a big disparity between Correa 
and Moreno’s model, due to the difference of time available to observe their action. 
It is recommendable to repeat the same study at the end of the term of the president 
Moreno, in order to control if the new results demonstrate significant modifications, 
compared with the ones presented in this paper.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
This study shows that the Ecuadorian electorate confirms the idea that a 
difference exists in the populist style between Rafael Correa and Lenín Moreno. 
So, we can accept the first hypothesis and reject the null hypothesis. In addition, 
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it can be noticed that people who identify themselves with Rafael Correa appear 
sensitive both to rhetoric and personalist elements. Nonetheless, we can also say 
that even if Correa had, according to the analyzed perception, a stronger 
populist style, populist elements can still be observed in Moreno’s style. So, we 
can say that in Ecuador, the population at large generally perceives a 
discontinuity in political style between Correa and Moreno, but not a total 
forsaking of populism in the current president. It could be interpreted in the 
sense that president Moreno desires to differentiate himself from his 
predecessor. Despite this, in order to limit the future use of populist rhetoric and 
personalism in Ecuadorian political competition, he has to make more efforts 
due to the appeal that populism has on the Ecuadorian public. Indeed, populism 
does not only depend on the attitude shown by political actors, but also in 
political culture, the strength of the state institutions, and finally the form by 
which the country is governed. In this regard, it is recommendable to undergo 
further studies that analyze the relationship between populism and the strong 
presidentialism that characterizes Ecuador, and how the perception of the 
people can play an important role on their degree of approval.  
 
 
Table 1. Variables related to populism 
Category Variables Code 
Literary sources 
Populist 
rhetoric  
He mentioned the existence of 
foreigner enemies, hostile to his 
person and ideas. 
MEE (de la Torre,2017; Zanatta, 
2018) 
He mentioned the existence of 
hostile situations to his person and 
ideas. 
MSA (Gratius & Rivero, 2018 ; 
de la Torre, 2017) 
He mentioned the existence of one 
national élite hostile to his person 
and ideas.  
MEC (Spanakos, 2008; Stanley, 
2008; Weyland, 1996; 
Panizza, 2005; Zanatta, 
2018) 
He mentioned that his government 
team and he are totally honest, 
capable and coherent, whilst his 
opponents are totally dishonest, 
incapable and incoherent.   
MHC (de la Torre, 2016; Laclau 
2005; Stanley, 2008 ; de la 
Torre, 1992 ; Gratius & 
Rivero, 2018 ; Mudde, 
2004) 
He mentioned to represent 
majority popular will.  
MVM (de la Torre, 2016; 
Canovan, 1999; Weyland, 
1996; Panizza, 2005)  
He mentioned that minority 
corresponds to an oligarchy or 
elite, that is part of a corrupted 
power.  
MMO (de la Torre, 2017; 
Spanakos, 2008; 
Panizza,2009) 
He mentioned that his opponents’ 
attitude are misleading and can 
MAE (Canovan, 1999; de la 
Torre, 1996)  
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produce damage to the country.  
He mentioned important past 
politicians (e.g. Simón Bolívar or 
Fidel Castro). 
MPP (de la Torre, 1992; de la 
Torre, 2017; Jiménez & 
Patarroyo, 2018 ) 
He mentioned that his ideals are 
revolutionary.  
MIR (Zanatta, 2018; Nuñez-
Sánchez, 2014; 
Panizza,2008)  
Personalism 
He based his political campaign on 
his imagine.  
CIP 
(de la Torre, 2017; Nuñez-
Sánchez, 2014) 
He showed himself as the only 
possible leader of his party.  
ULP 
(de la Torre, 2017; Panizza, 
2005) 
He showed himself as captivating. 
DCA 
(de la Torre, 1992; 
Canovan, 1999; Spanakos, 
2008)   
He used clothing (shirts, hats, ties, 
etc.) to be identifiable.  
PPR 
(Bajini, 2010; Espí, 2019) 
Others 
Populism is a positive factor in 
politics. 
PFP 
 
You think that Correa/Moreno is a 
populist. 
CPP 
 
How do you asses the figure of 
Correa/Moreno? 
VFP 
 
You think that during 
Correa/Moreno’s government 
political participation has grown. APP 
(Canovan, 1999; Spanakos, 
2008; Weyland, 1996; 
Panizza, 2005; Gratius & 
Rivero, 2018; de la 
Torre,2016) 
You feel identified with 
Correa/Moreno 
IRC/ILM 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation. 
 
 
 
Table 2. Correlation matrix, related to the existence of populist elements in Rafael Correa’s political style  
 
 IRC PFP MEE MSA MEC MHC MVM MMO MAE MPP MIR CIP ULP DCA PPR APP CPP VFP 
IRC 
1,000                  
991                  
PFP 
,096** 1,000                 
916 971                 
MEE 
,173** ,072* 1,000                
866 838 888                
MSA 
,153** ,130** ,821** 1,000               
859 839 850 879               
MEC 
,205** ,120** ,680** ,750** 1,000              
867 841 831 829 886              
MHC 
,233** ,085* ,573** ,609** ,694** 1,000             
913 878 846 847 874 934             
MVM 
,273** ,105** ,589** ,610** ,701** ,783** 1,000            
913 876 849 845 866 907 932            
MMO 
,273** ,145** ,543** ,588** ,687** ,702** ,724** 1,000           
890 868 838 840 851 882 884 909           
MAE 
,230** ,115** ,572** ,593** ,690** ,679** ,710** ,766** 1,000          
912 872 845 842 851 889 889 881 926          
MPP 
,283** ,088* ,467** ,475** ,608** ,603** ,647** ,626** ,679** 1,000         
883 849 821 821 825 864 866 859 868 900         
MIR 
,242** ,115** ,541** ,568** ,675** ,716** ,735** ,672** ,719** ,666** 1,000        
923 878 850 850 859 901 900 882 903 883 941        
CIP 
,148** ,079* ,475** ,499** ,577** ,519** ,541** ,541** ,550** ,515** ,596** 1,000       
957 922 865 860 867 911 915 897 905 885 918 978       
ULP 
,149** ,133** ,456** ,493** ,559** ,500** ,483** ,514** ,508** ,508** ,562** ,738** 1,000      
965 919 867 862 870 912 912 893 905 879 920 962 984      
DCA 
,321** ,096** ,369** ,400** ,497** ,499** ,507** ,478** ,503** ,499** ,518** ,614** ,629** 1,000     
959 914 861 856 867 908 909 894 904 880 918 956 961 977     
PPR 
,156** ,023 ,395** ,410** ,501** ,440** ,450** ,401** ,420** ,476** ,506** ,598** ,645** ,560** 1,000    
967 914 861 855 868 911 912 887 901 878 919 956 964 958 989    
APP
 
,513** ,103** ,225** ,219** ,278** ,276** ,308** ,296** ,270** ,273** ,294** ,224** ,210** ,316** ,168** 1,000   
 
935 903 847 838 848 886 890 881 883 865 892 932 931 932 931 958   
CPP 
,236** ,020 ,297** ,326** ,352** ,308** ,323** ,296** ,333** ,330** ,338** ,396** ,422** ,381** ,413** ,370** 1,000  
921 889 836 832 841 879 882 871 875 857 886 921 919 915 917 914 937  
VF
P 
,509** ,110** ,072* ,058 ,096** ,106** ,168** ,177** ,112** ,198** ,174** ,040 ,017 ,154** ,040 ,411** ,093** 1,000 
973 947 873 867 874 919 917 893 910 884 925 959 965 957 970 941 919 1039 
Source: Author’s own compilation. 
 
Table 3. Correlation matrix, related to the existence of populist elements in Lenín Moreno’s political style 
 
  ILM PFP MEE MSA MEC 
MH
C 
MV
M 
MM
O MAE MPP MIR CIP ULP DCA PPR APP CPP VFP 
ILM 1,000                  
 989                  
PFP ,076* 1,000                 
 916 971                 
MEE ,222*
* 
,154*
* 
1,000                
 838 814 858                
MSA ,220*
* 
,145*
* 
,757*
* 
1,000               
 844 821 833 863               
MEC ,175*
* 
,101*
* 
,682*
* 
,744*
* 
1,000              
 850 824 826 843 869              
MHC ,219*
* 
,034 ,399*
* 
,480*
* 
,528*
* 
1,000             
 875 840 823 836 845 894             
MV
M 
,287*
* 
,071* ,436*
* 
,457*
* 
,506*
* 
,603*
* 
1,000            
 900 861 824 833 840 857 919            
MM
O 
,232*
* 
,081* ,497*
* 
,519*
* 
,587*
* 
,507*
* 
,582*
* 
1,000           
 861 830 799 803 806 826 863 873           
MAE ,201*
* 
,096*
* 
,489*
* 
,553*
* 
,570*
* 
,463*
* 
,552*
* 
,633*
* 
1,00
0 
         
 873 839 808 812 816 834 864 850 889          
MPP ,323*
* 
,016 ,462*
* 
,456*
* 
,443*
* 
,353*
* 
,404*
* 
,542*
* 
,536*
* 
1,00
0 
        
 841 807 779 774 778 802 824 809 824 852         
MIR ,303*
* 
,059 ,403*
* 
,425*
* 
,432*
* 
,400*
* 
,497*
* 
,471*
* 
,547*
* 
,626*
* 
1,00
0 
       
 892 846 810 816 822 846 870 845 858 837 908        
CIP ,165*
* 
,049 ,345*
* 
,409*
* 
,371*
* 
,298*
* 
,413*
* 
,365*
* 
,394*
* 
,364*
* 
,416*
* 
1,00
0 
      
 951 901 834 840 848 871 889 857 871 835 885 966       
ULP ,331*
* 
,052 ,318*
* 
,340*
* 
,307*
* 
,241*
* 
,344*
* 
,372*
* 
,357*
* 
,408*
* 
,396*
* 
,572*
* 
1,00
0 
     
 970 915 845 851 858 882 902 866 881 842 900 957 988      
DCA ,336*
* 
,073* ,290*
* 
,328*
* 
,286*
* 
,287*
* 
,299*
* 
,307*
* 
,326*
* 
,316*
* 
,367*
* 
,548*
* 
,557*
* 
1,00
0 
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 961 912 840 847 851 874 893 863 873 839 884 943 964 977     
PPR ,321*
* 
,037 ,224*
* 
,263*
* 
,198*
* 
,187*
* 
,269*
* 
,300*
* 
,300*
* 
,382*
* 
,386*
* 
,457*
* 
,479*
* 
,460*
* 
1,00
0 
   
 953 898 827 834 840 865 886 851 863 832 885 936 954 945 967    
APP ,431*
* 
,132*
* 
,234*
* 
,257*
* 
,196*
* 
,273*
* 
,338*
* 
,259*
* 
,285*
* 
,331*
* 
,335*
* 
,292*
* 
,357*
* 
,420*
* 
,286*
* 
1,00
0 
  
 928 884 815 819 826 846 869 845 857 821 869 918 928 920 917 942   
CPP ,255*
* 
,120*
* 
,265*
* 
,316*
* 
,258*
* 
,254*
* 
,315*
* 
,264*
* 
,281*
* 
,380*
* 
,349*
* 
,414*
* 
,367*
* 
,372*
* 
,356*
* 
,505*
* 
1,00
0 
 
 911 878 807 809 816 832 855 828 839 803 845 901 909 904 902 899 924  
VFP ,249*
* 
,067* -,048 -,002 -,030 ,125*
* 
,130*
* 
,037 ,012 ,044 ,085* ,061 ,056 ,132*
* 
,010 ,239*
* 
,021 1,00
0 
  968 944 837 844 849 875 897 853 869 835 888 941 963 955 947 923 905 1035 
Source: Author’s own compilation.  
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Table 4. Descriptive analysis of the variables referring to populism in Correa and 
Moreno’s political style. 
Categories Variables Rafael Correa Lenín  Moreno 
  μ σ μ Σ 
 He mentioned the existence of 
foreigner enemies, hostile to his 
person and ideas. 
6,5 2,98 4,7 3,09 
 He mentioned the existence of 
hostile situations to his person 
and ideas. 
6,8 2,74 4,8 3,01 
 He mentioned the existence of 
one national élite hostile to his 
person and ideas.  
6,5 2,94 4,7 2,94 
 He mentioned that his 
government team and he are 
totally honest, capable and 
coherent, whilst his opponents 
are totally dishonest, incapable 
and incoherent.   
6,2 3,21 5,0 2,87 
Populist 
rhetoric 
He mentioned to represent 
majority popular will.  
6,3 3,09 5,3 2,72 
 He mentioned that minority 
corresponds to an oligarchy or 
elite, that is part of a corrupted 
power.  
6,2 3,06 4,6 2,74 
 He mentioned that his 
opponents’ attitude are 
misleading and can produce 
damage to the country.  
6,4 2,89 4,8 2,77 
 He mentioned important past 
politicians (e.g. Simón Bolívar 
or Fidel Castro) 
6,5 2,93 4,2 2,80 
 He mentioned that his ideals are 
revolutionary.  
6,8 3,01 4,5 2,85 
 He based his political campaign 
on his imagine.   
6,8 2,89 5,2 2,85 
 He showed himself as the only 
possible leader of his party.  
7,2 2,85 4,9 2,81 
Personalism He showed himself as 
captivating. 
6,6 3,00 5,1 2,80 
 He used clothing (shirts, hats, 
ties, etc.) to be identifiable.  
7,3 2,92 4,8 3,07 
 Populism is a positive factor in 
politics. 
4,8 3,18 4,8 3,18 
 You think that Correa/Moreno is 
a populist. 
6,3 3,03 4,7 2,69 
Others How do you asses the figure of 
Correa/Moreno? 
3,8 3,25 5,1 2,64 
 You think that during 5,4 3,05 5,0 2,64 
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Correa/Moreno’s government 
political participation has 
grown. 
 You feel identified with 
Correa/Moreno 
4,6 3,49 4,0 2,86 
Source: Author’s own compilation. 
 
 
Table 5. Adjusted multiple linear regression models, related to Rafael Correa and 
Lenín Moreno. 
Variables Modelo 1 
Rafael 
Correa 
Modelo 2 
Lenín 
Moreno 
How do you asses the figure of Correa/Moreno? 
  0,314*** 
(0,033) 
     0,140*** 
(0,034) 
He mentioned the existence of one national élite hostile to his 
person and ideas. 
-0,116* 
(0,049) 
 
He mentioned that minority corresponds to an oligarchy or 
elite, that is part of a corrupted power 
  0,111* 
(0,047) 
 
He mentioned important past politicians (e.g. Simón Bolívar 
or Fidel Castro) 
  0,103* 
(0,046) 
    0,119** 
(0,039) 
He mentioned the existence of foreigner enemies, hostile to 
his person and ideas. 
   0,077* 
(0,034) 
He based his political campaign on his imagine. 
  -0,122** 
(0,048) 
    -0,134*** 
(0,040) 
He showed himself as captivating. 
     0,187*** 
(0,046) 
     0,167*** 
(0,042) 
He used clothing (shirts, hats, ties, etc.) to be identifiable. 
0,084* 
(0,042) 
     0,191*** 
(0,037) 
You think that during Correa/Moreno’s government political 
participation has grown. 
     0,376*** 
(0,037) 
     0,262*** 
(0,040) 
Constant 
-0,088 
(0,308) 
0,210 
(0,294) 
Adjusted squared R 0,425 0,285 
Significance level 0,001***; 0,05** and 0,1*. 
Source: Author’s own compilation. 
 
Table 6. Standardized beta coefficients and collinearity analysis of the models 
referring to Rafael Correa and Lenín Moreno 
 Model 1: Rafael Correa Model 2: Lenín Moreno 
Standardized 
Beta 
coefficients 
Collinearity Analysis  Standardized 
Beta 
coefficients 
Collinearity Analysis 
Tolerance Beta Tolerance Beta 
VFP 0,301 0,774 1,292 0,134 0,927 1,078 
MEC -0,099 0,429 2,329    
MMO 0,098 0,433 2,311    
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MPP 0,089 0,475 2,106 0,119 0,667 1,500 
CIP -0,102 0,470 2,126 -0,131 0,643 1,556 
DCA 0,162 0,489 2,044 0,162 0,592 1,690 
PPR 0,073 0,576 1,736 0,201 0,672 1,487 
APP 0,335 0,702 1,424 0,243 0,716 1,396 
MEE    0,082 0,743 1,346 
Source: Author’s own compilation. 
 
